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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
This case presents a situation familiar to our district 
courts.  Two related lawsuits are pending — one each in state 
and federal court.  The state action seeks to determine a 
defendant’s liability for an alleged harm, and the federal action 
seeks only a declaratory judgment on an insurer’s obligation to 
defend and indemnify the defendant.  The District Court here 
exercised its discretion to abstain from entertaining the 
declaratory action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 (“DJA”), largely because it determined that 
the state court action concerning liability and the declaratory 
judgment action were parallel proceedings.  The District Court 
further concluded that the remaining factors guiding the 
consideration of whether it should entertain the declaratory 
action weighed against retaining jurisdiction.  
 
Whether a state action parallels a federal action — in 
which case a district court has significant discretion under the 
DJA to decline a lawsuit seeking only declaratory relief — is a 
question that has divided the district courts in this Circuit.  
Although the question is not dipositive to a court’s decision to 
abstain, it is important, and is one that courts must address.  We 
hold that contemporaneous state and federal proceedings are 
parallel for purposes of the DJA when they are substantially 
similar, and the two proceedings here were not.  We further 
hold that the lack of parallel state and federal proceedings — a 
significant factor favoring hearing the case — is not 
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outweighed by other factors.  For the reasons that follow, we 




In 2007, appellee Ronald Kelly’s car collided with 
another vehicle driven by a drunk driver.  The driver had been 
drinking at a bar, Princeton Tavern, owned by BBK Tavern, 
Inc. (“Princeton Tavern”), which was insured under a dram 
shop liability policy issued by State National Insurance 
Company (“State National”).  The insurance policy had been 
procured by appellee Carman Corporation (“Carman”), 
Princeton Tavern’s insurance broker. 
 
In 2009, Ronald and Patrice Kelly (collectively, “the 
Kellys”) sued Princeton Tavern in state court seeking damages 
for injuries and economic losses caused by the collision.  Kelly 
v. Siuma, Case No. 090503424 (Phila. Cty., Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
May Term 2009).  The Kellys eventually obtained a default 
judgment against Princeton Tavern and settled for $5 million. 
 
When that lawsuit was filed, Princeton Tavern alerted 
its broker, Carman, and requested that Carman notify State 
National of the insurer’s obligation under the dram shop policy 
to defend and indemnify Princeton Tavern.  Carman did not do 
this.  Lacking notice of the lawsuit, State National refused to 
cover Princeton Tavern’s legal liability.  After the Kellys 
secured the judgment, Princeton Tavern assigned to them the 
rights to sue Carman for its failure to notify State National 
about the litigation. 
 
In July 2013, the Kellys sued Carman in state court for 
negligence and breach of contract.  Ronald & Patrice Kelly, as 
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assignees of BBK Tavern, Inc. v. The Carman Corp., Case No. 
4825 (Phila. Cty., Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July Term 2013) (the “Tort 
Action”).  While that case was proceeding, the Kellys filed a 
separate state-court action against Carman and its professional 
liability insurer, appellant Maxum Specialty Insurance Group 
(“Maxum”), seeking a declaratory judgment that Maxum was 
obligated to defend and indemnify Carman against the Tort 
Action claims.1  Kelly v. Maxum Specialty Ins. Grp., Case No. 
233 (Phila. Cty., Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. Term 2014) (the 
“Declaratory Action”).  
 
Maxum removed the Declaratory Action to the District 
Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting diversity jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  Although the Kellys and 
Carman are Pennsylvania citizens, Maxum — a Georgia 
company — argued that the Kellys and Carman are together 
interested in securing Maxum’s coverage for Carman’s 
potential liability.  Therefore, according to Maxum, diversity 
of citizenship (and thus federal jurisdiction) would exist once 
Carman was properly realigned to join the Kellys as a plaintiff. 
 
The Kellys moved to remand the Declaratory Action to 
state court.  They argued that they and Carman do not have the 
same interests and should not be realigned to secure diversity 
jurisdiction.  They also requested alternatively that the District 
Court exercise its discretion under the DJA to decline 
                                              
1 After filing the Declaratory Action, the Kellys sought 
to stay discovery in the Tort Action to allow the issue of 
coverage to be resolved.  Carman opposed the Kellys’ request, 
arguing that it was premature to address coverage prior to the 
resolution of Carman’s liability. 
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jurisdiction.  Maxum opposed the motion, and Carman filed a 
response in support of remand.2 
 
Weighing the factors for deciding whether to abstain 
from entertaining declaratory judgment actions set forth in 
Reifer v. Westport Insurance Corp., 751 F.3d 129, 143-46 (3d 
Cir. 2014), the District Court sided with the Kellys and 
Carman.  The Court’s conclusion rested heavily on its 
determination that the still-pending state Tort Action 
constituted a parallel proceeding to the Declaratory Action.  By 
order issued on September 29, 2015, the District Court 
declined to hear the lawsuit and remanded the action to state 
court.  With the motion resolved, the Court did not address 
whether realignment of the parties to secure diversity 






A district court’s discretionary remand in a declaratory 
judgment action is a final decision that is appealable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.3  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 133.  We review the 
                                              
2 After removal, Maxum also moved to dismiss the 
Declaratory Action, arguing that the Kellys lacked standing to 
sue Maxum and that Maxum did not owe coverage to Carman.  
The District Court granted remand and did not reach the 
motion to dismiss. 
3 Under existing caselaw, the District Court was 
permitted to consider and grant a discretionary remand under 
the DJA before determining whether it possessed subject 
matter jurisdiction.  “[A] federal court has leeway to choose 
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among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the 
merits.”  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 
549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon 
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999)); see also id. at 432 (holding 
that courts may dismiss a case on forum non conveniens 
grounds before considering jurisdiction).  Deciding to abstain 
from entertaining a request for declaratory relief “conclusively 
determines an issue that is separate from the merits” and results 
in the court “disassociat[ing] itself from the case entirely.”  See 
Reifer, 751 F.3d at 133-34 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714 (1996)).  Because the District 
Court’s remand “d[id] not entail any assumption by the court 
of substantive ‘law-declaring power,’” Sinochem Int’l, 549 
U.S. at 433 (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584), ascertaining 
jurisdiction was not necessary before taking that action.  Cf. id. 
at 431 (observing that a federal court need not “decide whether 
the parties present an Article III case or controversy before 
abstaining under [another abstention doctrine]”); GDG 
Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov’t of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1028 
(11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing the district court’s decision to 
abstain based on international comity principles even though it 
“did not reach the question of whether foreign sovereign 
immunity precluded subject matter jurisdiction”); Tony Alamo 
Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664 F.3d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 
2012) (“[W]e may affirm on abstention grounds without first 
resolving the standing issues.”); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. 
Court for D.C., 486 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(“Sinochem thus firmly establishes that certain non-merits, 
nonjurisdictional issues may be addressed preliminarily.”). 
We note that had the District Court decided not to 
abstain, it would have needed to assure itself that jurisdiction 
existed before proceeding any further.  See Emp’rs Ins. of 
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District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 137-39.  
In doing so, we review legal questions, including the question 
of whether state court and federal court proceedings are 
parallel, de novo.  See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George 




The Kellys seek a declaratory judgment, a remedy made 
available to the federal courts by the DJA.4  That statute 
provides that federal courts “may declare the rights and other 
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 
                                              
Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42, 47 (3d Cir. 
1990) (remanding a case to the district court which had stayed 
a lawsuit brought under the DJA without first considering 
jurisdiction). 
4 Although courts often refer to a court’s “jurisdiction” 
under the DJA, the statute is not a jurisdictional grant.  Rather, 
the Supreme Court has characterized the DJA as procedural, 
affording a remedial option in a case over which a court must 
have an independent basis for exercising jurisdiction.  Skelly 
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950). 
Relatedly, we agree with the District Court that because 
federal courts apply federal procedural law in federal actions, 
the DJA and not state declaratory judgment law supplies the 
procedural law that governs this case.  This is notwithstanding 
the fact that the relief sought in the removed Declaratory 
Action was requested under the Pennsylvania Declaratory 
Judgments Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 7531, et seq.  See Reifer 
v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d 129, 134 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014); 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 736 F.3d 
255, 261 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2201(a) (emphasis added).  Granting a declaratory judgment 
is therefore discretionary and a court may abstain from 
entertaining an action seeking only declaratory relief.5  Reifer, 
751 F.3d at 134 (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 
U.S. 491, 494 (1942)); Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 
277, 282 (1995) (“[D]istrict courts possess discretion in 
determining whether and when to entertain an action under the 
[DJA], even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter 
jurisdictional prerequisites.”); see also Rarick v. Federated 
Serv. Ins. Co., 852 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2017) (clarifying the 
extent of a court’s discretion where a litigant seeks both 
declaratory and non-declaratory relief). 
 
The discretion courts exercise in actions seeking only 
declaratory relief is “substantial” but nonetheless “bounded 
and reviewable.”  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 140.  On the one hand, 
courts may abstain based on “considerations of practicality and 
wise judicial administration.”  Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288.  On the 
other hand, the “wholesale” dismissal of certain types of cases 
brought under the DJA is improper, as litigants should not be 
unjustifiably denied the right to obtain an authorized remedy 
in federal court.  See Reifer, 751 F.3d at 147. 
We have directed courts deciding whether to entertain a 
declaratory action to weigh certain enumerated and other 
                                              
5 It bears repeating the admonition, well noted in the 
caselaw, that this discretion is “unique and substantial” and is 
an exception to the otherwise “virtually unflagging obligation” 
of federal courts to “exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them 
by Congress.”  Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 284, 
286 (1995) (citing Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 817-18 (1976)). 
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factors “bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment 
remedy, and the fitness of the case for [federal] resolution.”  Id. 
at 138 (quoting Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289).  This type of 
“uniform approach” is intended to “clarify for parties and 
district courts the relevant considerations to sound and 
reasoned discretion, as well as help properly focus our abuse 
of discretion review.”  Id. at 146. 
 
Courts should first determine whether there is a 
“parallel state proceeding.”  Id. at 143, 146.  Although the 
existence of a parallel state proceeding is but one factor for 
courts to consider, it is a significant factor that is treated with 
“increased emphasis.”  Id. at 144; see also Sherwin-Williams 
Co. v. Holmes Cty., 343 F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that “the presence or absence of a pending parallel state 
proceeding is an important factor”); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
existence of [a parallel state] proceeding should be a significant 
factor in the district court’s determination.  But it is not 
dispositive.”).  We have held, as a result, that “the absence of 
pending parallel state proceedings militates significantly in 
favor of exercising jurisdiction, although it alone does not 
require such an exercise.”  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 144.  Inversely, 
the existence of a parallel state proceeding “militates 
significantly in favor of declining jurisdiction.”  Id. at 144-45. 
 
Courts should then weigh other factors.  Specifically, if 
a state parallel proceeding does not exist, then “as part of 
exercising sound and reasoned discretion, district courts 
declining jurisdiction should be rigorous in ensuring 
themselves that the lack of pending parallel state proceedings 
is outweighed by opposing factors.”  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 144.  
When state parallel proceedings do exist, “district courts 
11 
 
exercising jurisdiction should be rigorous in ensuring 
themselves that the existence of pending parallel state 
proceedings is outweighed by opposing factors.”  Id. at 145.  
Courts should give the following and other factors6 
“meaningful consideration . . . to the extent they are relevant”: 
 
(1) the likelihood that a federal court declaration 
will resolve the uncertainty of obligation which 
gave rise to the controversy; 
(2) the convenience of the parties; 
(3) the public interest in settlement of the 
uncertainty of obligation; 
(4) the availability and relative convenience of 
other remedies; 
                                              
6 We have advised that this list of factors is not 
exhaustive and that other considerations might be relevant in 
the appropriate case.  See Reifer, 751 F.3d at 146-47.  For 
instance, we noted in Reifer that our decision in State Auto 
Insurance Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2000), might 
supply additional guidance in insurance cases.  Reifer, 751 
F.3d at 146-47.  And we have summarized United States v. 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, 923 
F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1991), as providing that declining a 
declaratory judgment action may not be prudent “when the 
issues include[] federal statutory interpretation, the 
government’s choice of a federal forum, an issue of sovereign 
immunity, or inadequacy of the state proceeding.”  Summy, 
234 F.3d at 134.  Whichever factors the district court 
determines to be applicable, “[t]he weighing of these factors 
should be articulated in a record sufficient to enable our abuse 
of discretion review.”  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 147. 
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(5) a general policy of restraint when the same 
issues are pending in a state court; 
(6) avoidance of duplicative litigation; 
(7) prevention of the use of the declaratory action 
as a method of procedural fencing or as a means 
to provide another forum in a race for res 
judicata; and 
(8) (in the insurance context), an inherent 
conflict of interest between an insurer’s duty to 
defend in a state court and its attempt to 
characterize that suit in federal court as falling 
within the scope of a policy exclusion. 
 







The District Court first concluded that the Kellys’ Tort 
Action against Carman and their Declaratory Action against 
Carman and Maxum constituted parallel proceedings.  
According to the Court, the Tort Action “directly implicate[s] 
Maxum’s obligations to defend and indemnify [Carman]” — 
also at issue in the Declaratory Action — as “the question of 
coverage . . . will necessarily arise in the state court action 
before it is completed.”7  Appendix (“App.”) 11.  Maxum 
challenges this determination, arguing that it is not a party to 
                                              
7 The Court also found salient the fact that the 
declaratory judgment action sought only “an interpretation of 
state law.”  App. 11. 
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the Tort Action, the question of coverage had not been raised 
in state court, and it may never be raised given the possibility 
of the Kellys losing the lawsuit. 
 
When faced with similar facts, our district courts have 
divided as to how to determine whether a state action for 
damages and a related federal proceeding over insurance 
coverage are parallel.  The District Court here essentially 
followed others in this Circuit which have held that, for 
purposes of the DJA, a state proceeding parallels a federal 
action where there is the potential that the federal claims might 
be satisfactorily adjudicated in state court.  App. 10-11; see 
also App. 353 (District Court noting “you certainly have the 
potential for a parallel proceeding in the other case”).  Under 
this approach, the federal court is free to decline to entertain 
the insurer’s declaratory judgment action because the issue of 
a defendant’s insurance coverage eventually could arise in an 
underlying state negligence action. 
 
We disagree with this approach.  Proceedings are not 
parallel merely because they have the potential to dispose of 
the same claims.  Defining “parallel state proceeding” so 
broadly balloons a court’s discretion to decline a DJA action 
beyond the measured bounds we set forth in our prior 
decisions.  Although the existence or non-existence of parallel 
proceedings is only one of many factors a court must consider, 
it is a significant factor, and we must correct the error 
propagating among some of the district courts in this Circuit.  
We hold that the mere potential or possibility that two 
proceedings will resolve related claims between the same 
parties is not sufficient to make those proceedings parallel; 
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rather, there must be a substantial similarity in issues and 
parties between contemporaneously pending proceedings.8 
 
Review of relevant precedent compels this conclusion.  
A parallel state proceeding is a pending matter “involving the 
same parties and presenting [the] opportunity for ventilation of 
the same state law issues.”9  Wilton, 515 U.S. at 283; see also 
                                              
8 Strict identity between parties and claims is not 
necessary for pending proceedings to be substantially similar, 
although that will be the most usual circumstance in which a 
court finds parallel proceedings to exist.  “Substantial 
similarity” only means that the parties involved are closely 
related and that the resolution of an issue in one will 
necessarily settle the matter in the other.  See, e.g., Fru-Con 
Constr. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 535 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (“[Substantial similarity] occurs when there is a 
substantial likelihood that the state proceeding will fully 
dispose of the claims presented in the federal court.” (citing 
TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 592 (7th Cir. 
2005))); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 994, 
997 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that state tort actions and a related 
federal insurance declaratory judgment action were not 
parallel, even though “the issues in each proceeding may 
depend on some of the same facts,” because the state lawsuits 
“involve parties, arguments, and issues different from those in 
federal court proceedings”). 
9 In both Brillhart and Wilton, the Supreme Court cases 
discussing a court’s discretion under the DJA, state court 
proceedings had already reached the garnishment stage and 
featured insurance coverage as an issue and the insurer as a 
party.  Accordingly, neither case concerned a court’s decision 
to abstain in deference to a non-parallel state action.  See 
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State Auto Ins. Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 
2000) (describing a parallel proceeding as one in which “the 
same issues are pending”).  Germane factors include the scope 
of the state court proceeding, the claims and defenses asserted, 
and whether necessary parties had been or could be joined.  See 
Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495; see also Md. Cas. Co. v. Consumers 
Fin. Serv., Inc., of Pa., 101 F.2d 514, 515 (3d Cir. 1938) 
(explaining that a court may abstain from issuing a declaratory 
judgment that is “being sought merely to determine issues 
involved in cases already pending,” but not “if the controversy 
between the parties will not necessarily be determined in” that 
pending action).  Such analysis contemplates comparing the 
state and federal action as they contemporaneously exist, not 
as they might eventually be. 
                                              
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290 (refraining from “delineat[ing] the 
outer boundaries of [courts’] discretion in other cases, for 
example, . . . cases in which there are no parallel state 
proceedings”).  Regardless, the Supreme Court’s guidance is 
instructive. 
Some district courts have seized this “opportunity” 
language from the Supreme Court to conclude that potentiality 
is sufficient to render a proceeding parallel, but other language 
makes the Court’s intended meaning at least ambiguous.  For 
comparison, see Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495 (explaining it would 
be “uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to 
proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is 
pending in a state court presenting the same issues . . . between 
the same parties”), and Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290 (discussing 
parallel proceedings as those which are already “underway in 
state court”).  The body of law applying Brillhart and Wilton, 
discussed more infra, makes clearer that potentiality is not 




We employ a substantially consistent definition of 
parallelism when considering abstention in other 
circumstances.  For instance, determining whether a state and 
federal action are parallel is necessary when deciding whether 
to abstain under the doctrine articulated in Colorado River 
Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 
(1976).10  In that context, we have recognized simply that 
“cases are parallel when they involve the same parties and 
claims.”  Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 1997).  
More specifically, parallel proceedings are those that are “truly 
                                              
10 Colorado River abstention is a good comparator 
because it applies in circumstances “where the presence of 
concurrent state proceedings may indicate that a district court 
should abstain from the ‘contemporaneous exercise of 
concurrent jurisdiction[]’ due to principles of ‘[w]ise judicial 
administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial 
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.’”  Nat’l 
City Mortg. Co. v. Stephen, 647 F.3d 78, 83-84 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Trent v. Dial Med. of Fla., 
Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 1994)) (surveying the various 
abstention doctrines).  These are some of the same concerns 
that animate the discretion afforded by the DJA.  Cf. 10B 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2759 n.22 (4th ed. 2008) 
(noting the “parallel between federal abstention doctrine and 
the court’s discretion to decline to entertain a declaratory 
judgment action”).  By no means are we equating the doctrines; 
although tests for employing both require evaluating similar 
factors, the “district court’s discretion under the [DJA] is 
significantly greater than under Colorado River.”  Pa. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Res., 923 F.2d at 1074. 
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duplicative,” that is, when the parties and the claims are 
“identical,” or at least “effectively the same.”  Trent v. Dial 
Med. of Fla., Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 1994), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Nat’l 
City Mortg. Co. v. Stephen, 647 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2011); see 
also Hamilton, 571 F.3d at 307 (identifying the first question 
in Colorado River abstention analysis as whether “there is a 
parallel state proceeding that raises ‘substantially identical 
claims [and] nearly identical allegations and issues’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 
204 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005))).  Cases are not parallel under Colorado 
River abstention where the “federal court case involves claims 
that are distinct from those at issue in a state court case,” like 
where parties in “the two cases employ[] substantially different 
‘approaches’ [which] might ‘achieve potentially different 
results.’”  Trent, 33 F.3d at 224 (quoting Complaint of Bankers 
Tr. Co. v. Chatterjee, 636 F.2d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1980)); see also 
Univ. of Md. at Balt. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 
265, 276 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that abstention is 
inappropriate where there is a “lack of identity of all issues” 
between lawsuits and “no theoretical obstacle to both actions 
proceeding independently”). 
 
Therefore, at least under Colorado River, a state 
proceeding does not parallel a federal proceeding just because 
there is the potential that issues in the latter may arise in the 
former.  The proceedings must involve substantially similar 
parties and claims at the time the federal court is deciding 
whether to abstain.  Indeed, other courts to have addressed this 
question agree.  See, e.g., Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled 
Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 535 (8th Cir. 2009) (“This 
[parallelism] analysis focuses on matters as they currently 
exist, not as they could be modified.” (citing Baskin v. Bath 
18 
 
Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 15 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 
1994))); Fox v. Maulding, 16 F.3d 1079, 1081 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(declining to consider “how the state proceedings could have 
been brought in theory” in favor of “examin[ing] the state 
proceedings as they actually exist to determine whether they 
are parallel to the federal proceedings”); McLaughlin v. United 
Va. Bank, 955 F.2d 930, 935 (4th Cir. 1992) (reversing 
abstention on the grounds that the federal and state actions 
were not parallel after observing that, notwithstanding the 
“changing nature” of the underlying state actions, “[the 
plaintiff]’s personal rights, as asserted in the federal diversity 
case, are not now protected in state proceedings” (emphasis 
added)). 
 
A similar rule — that proceedings are not parallel 
merely because of potentiality — is warranted to guide 
abstention under the DJA.  Cf., e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. 
Integrity Land Title Co., 721 F.3d 958, 971 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(concluding that the actions were not parallel because although 
the same issues raised in federal court “could have arisen” in 
pending state proceedings, it was not “likely that the state-court 
actions actually would clarify and resolve the issues presented 
in federal court”).  A contrary rule risks hollowing the DJA’s 
remedial grant.  Declaratory judgments allow parties 
prospectively to settle concrete questions concerning their 
legal rights and duties; foreclosing that remedy because the 
questions may eventually be answered in another forum 
undermines the utility of the declaratory action.  Cf. Rarick, 
852 F.3d at 227, 229-30 (explaining that the DJA allows parties 
to “clarify legal relationships” and “make responsible 
decisions about the future,” goals which should not be 
“subvert[ed]” by the court’s discretion to decline the lawsuit 
(quoting Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 
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643, 649 (3d Cir. 1990))); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Zurich Ins. 
Co., 422 F.2d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 1970) (observing that the 
dismissal of a DJA lawsuit over insurance coverage, an issue 
which had not arisen in the related state proceeding, “is leaving 
the controversy between [the parties] unsettled with a lack of 
clarification of the legal relations in issue”).  Moreover, district 
courts applying a potentiality standard would possess virtually 
unbounded discretion to deny litigants seeking declaratory 
judgments access to federal court, as they could abstain from a 
case based only on speculation about how another action will 
proceed.  Cf. New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int’l Union, United 
Mine Workers of Am., 946 F.2d 1072, 1074 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(“[Abstention doctrine] does not give federal courts carte 
blanche to decline to hear cases within their jurisdiction merely 
because issues or factual disputes in those cases may be 
addressed in past or pending proceedings before state 
tribunals.” (quoting United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 
411, 417 (D. Md. 1985))). 
 
Rather than sanctioning such a broad standard, we 
conclude that requiring a district court to consider whether the 
proceeding before it is substantially similar to a 
contemporaneous state proceeding will better enable the court 
to weigh the interests underlying its significant discretion and 
a litigant’s entitlement to seek declaratory relief in federal 
court.11  See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494-95; Md. Cas. Co., 101 
                                              
11 Some Courts of Appeals have, in dicta, used language 
suggesting a broader understanding of “parallel proceeding” 
which incorporates potentiality.  See, e.g., Golden Eagle Ins. 
Co. v. Travelers Cos., 103 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]he absence of a parallel state proceeding is not necessarily 
dispositive [to the question of whether a district court should 
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F.2d at 515 (stating that abstention is appropriate where a 
declaratory judgment is “being sought merely to determine 




It is clear that the two proceedings here are not parallel.  
Maxum is not a party to the Tort Action, and the questions of 
whether Carman’s insurance policy with Maxum covers 
Carman’s potential liability and whether Carman is in fact 
liable to the Kellys are distinct.12  The issue of coverage is not 
                                              
abstain under the DJA]; the potential for such a proceeding 
may suffice.”), overruled on other grounds by Gov’t Emps. 
Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc).  Such language, however, has been employed in the 
context of determining that the absence or presence of a 
parallel state proceeding does not per se require a district court 
to entertain or decline a declaratory judgment action.  See 
id.; see also, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co., 343 F.3d at 392-93 
(citing Golden Eagle when counting the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit as among those courts which do not employ 
a per se rule).  We too reject such a bright-line per se rule, as 
we have already discussed; and we read the discussion 
in Golden Eagle to pertain to the varied circumstances in 
which it is appropriate for a district court to abstain as opposed 
to a technical definition of parallelism.  To the extent that 
another court holds that a state proceeding parallels a federal 
proceeding based only on the possible issues which it could 
potentially encompass, we respectfully disagree. 
12 It is possible that, in certain circumstances, 
determining the issue of coverage will rely on questions central 
to the underlying liability proceeding.  See, e.g., Nationwide 
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necessary to the resolution of the state action — we cannot at 
this point predict the course which that lawsuit will take. 
 
This is not a novel disposition, as we have previously 
encountered similar facts.  In Maryland Casualty Co., an 
individual brought an auto injury claim against a company in 
state court, and the company’s insurer sought a declaratory 
judgment of nonliability under the policy in federal court.  101 
F.2d at 514-15.  We held that the issues involved in the state 
and federal lawsuits — the extent of the company’s liability to 
the injured persons and the extent of coverage owed by the 
insurer to the company, respectively — were distinct.  Id. at 
515-16.  We concluded that the company was entitled to have 
its rights settled in federal court, and that the district court 
“exceeded its discretionary power i[n] dismissing the petition 
for a declaratory judgment.”  Id. at 516.  Similarly, in Terra 
Nova Insurance Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., although we eventually 
affirmed the district court’s decision to stay the case, we noted 
that a state tort action and the insurer’s federal declaratory 
judgment action over coverage were non-parallel.  887 F.2d 
1213, 1219 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1989).  Several of our sister Courts 
                                              
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 95 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276-77 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) (staying a declaratory action in which the insurer 
disclaimed coverage on the basis that the plaintiffs were the 
defendant’s employees, an issue already in dispute in a pending 
state lawsuit).  Even if the proceedings are not parallel as we 
have defined it, such may be the type of situation which 
nevertheless warrants a court’s abstention.  But this is not the 
case here, where Maxum’s coverage arguments are predicated 
on the timing of the Kellys’ claim and the identity of the 
insurer, issues entirely independent of whether Carman was 
negligent.   
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of Appeals have reached the same conclusion in comparable 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., 
Inc., 426 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a state tort 
lawsuit and the insurer’s federal coverage declaratory lawsuit 
were not parallel because although the issues may “depend on 
some of the same facts,” the state proceeding involved “parties, 
arguments, and issues different from those in the federal 
[suit]”); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 
371, 380 (4th Cir. 1994) (“We are satisfied that there is no 
significant overlap in the issues of fact that must be decided to 
resolve these two separate and independent legal 
controversies.”); Am. States Ins. Co. v. D’Atri, 375 F.2d 761, 
763 (6th Cir. 1967) (rejecting the argument that an insurer’s 
obligation to defend and indemnify its insured against a tort 
claim was “inextricably bound up with” the question of the 
insured’s liability to the tort claimant); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
422 F.2d at 589-90 (same). 
 
In sum, there is no substantial similarity between the 
Tort Action and Declaratory Action, and the District Court’s 
conclusion that they are parallel was in error. 
 
We reiterate that a strict definition of parallelism need 
not hobble a district court’s unique leeway to decline from 
issuing declaratory relief.  Although “the existence or non-
existence of pending parallel state proceedings” is important in 
a court’s assessment, it is not dispositive.  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 
143-44; see also id. at 147 (“As our non-exhaustive, multi-
factor test makes clear, there are many potential considerations 
that properly inform a district court’s sound and reasoned 
discretion.”).  We therefore must turn to consider the District 






After finding a parallel state proceeding, the District 
Court considered the remaining Reifer factors and counted four 
as weighing against exercising jurisdiction and four as neutral.  
The factors the Court found to favor the motion to remand 
included the third, fifth, sixth, and eighth factors; the factors 
the Court found to be neutral included the first, second, fourth, 
and seventh factors.  Because there were no factors supporting 
the District Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in its view, and 
because of its conclusion that there existed a parallel state 
proceeding, the District Court declined jurisdiction and granted 
the motion to remand.  In doing so, the District Court abused 
its discretion.  Insofar as the state Tort Action and this 
Declaratory Action were not parallel, the District Court should 
have considered the remaining factors as prescribed in Reifer 
to “be rigorous in ensuring [itself] that the lack of pending 
parallel state proceedings is outweighed by opposing factors.”  
Id. at 144.  The lack of pending parallel state proceedings here 
was not outweighed by opposing factors. 
 
First, a declaratory judgment by the District Court 
would resolve the uncertainty that prompted filing of the 
Declaratory Action.  The Kellys filed their complaint “seeking 
[a] declaratory judgment to obtain an adjudication that 
Defendant, Maxum Specialty Insurance Group, is obligated to 
provide a defense and indemnification to its insureds . . . .”  
App. 37.  Declaratory relief by the District Court would 
unquestionably clarify and settle the dispute regarding 
Maxum’s obligations under the insurance policy.  
 
Second, none of the parties will be inconvenienced by 
having this matter adjudicated in the federal forum.  The 
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District Court considering the Declaratory Action sits in the 
same city as the court in which the Kellys originally filed suit. 
 
Third, the parties do not aver that any public interest is 
at stake other than the usual interest in the fair adjudication of 
legal disputes, an interest which the District Court is well-
equipped to address.13 
  
Fourth, the parties do not argue that other remedies 
would be adequate, let alone more convenient.  The state and 
                                              
13 The District Court found that the third factor 
supported declining jurisdiction “because a state court is better 
suited” to decide this case.  App. 12-13.  Apparently relying 
upon comity concerns, the Court observed in its analysis that 
“federal courts usually prefer that state courts are offered the 
first opportunity to interpret and apply state law” and that the 
public interest is served by having a state court resolve state-
law disputes.  App. 12.  But we rejected the same catch-all 
analysis in Reifer.  See 751 F.3d at 149 (noting that instead of 
declining jurisdiction because of “the importance of respecting 
the ability of the [state] court system” to enforce state law, 
“[w]e would have preferred the District Court to squarely 
address the alleged novelty of [the] state law claims”).  The 
parties do not contend that there is an unsettled question of 
state law or important policy issue implicated by the coverage 
claims here.  Absent this, there is little reason for a federal court 
to be reluctant about deciding this case.  See id. at 147 
(“Federal and state courts are equally capable of applying 
settled state law to a difficult set of facts.” (alteration omitted) 
(quoting Heritage Farms Inc. v. Solebury Twp., 671 F.2d 743, 
747 (3d Cir. 1982))). 
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federal courts are equally able to grant effective relief in these 
circumstances.  
 
Fifth, the issue of Maxum’s obligations under its 
insurance policy with Carman is not pending in a state court.  
Maxum is not even a party in the pending state court action and 
the insurance coverage dispute cannot be fully resolved 
without Maxum.  As a result, the general policy of restraint 
does not apply in the present case. 
 
Sixth, and relatedly, there is no reason at this juncture 
to be concerned about duplicative litigation as the issues in the 
two proceedings are distinct.  Arguably, settling the dispute in 
the District Court may avoid duplicative litigation, considering 
that the parties have already begun to litigate the issue of 
coverage in the federal forum. 
 
Seventh, there is no issue here of “procedural fencing” 
or a “race for res judicata.”  App. 13.  The Kellys initiated both 
the Tort Action and Declaratory Action and there has been no 
concern expressed that removal of the Declaratory Action was 
driven by an improper motive. 
 
Eighth, and finally, there is no indication that a conflict 
exists for Maxum related to any obligations it has to defend 
Carman in the Tort Action.  Maxum is not a party to the Tort 
Action; nor is there reason to believe it should or might be a 
party, given that it disclaimed coverage and given that Carman 
in fact opposed the Kellys’ motion seeking time to allow 
Maxum to join the proceeding.   
 




We hold, contrary to the District Court, that the state 
Tort Action and the Declaratory Action in federal court are not 
parallel proceedings.  The nonexistence of a parallel state 
proceeding weighed significantly in favor of the District Court 
entertaining rather that remanding the Declaratory Action, but 
did not require it.  Rather, before declining to consider the 
Declaratory Action, the District Court, in exercising its 
discretion, had to ensure itself that the factors enunciated in 
Reifer outweighed the lack of a parallel state proceeding.  
These factors did not outweigh the lack of a parallel state 
proceeding in this case.  As a result, “considerations of 
practicality and wise judicial administration,” Wilton, 515 U.S. 
at 288, counsel against abstention, and we conclude that the 





Before the case proceeds, however, the District Court 
must determine whether it possesses jurisdiction to hear the 
case.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
93-102 (1998) (holding that courts must consider their 
jurisdiction before they reach the merits of a case).  Maxum 
asserts that diversity jurisdiction will exist under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332 once the Court realigns the parties according to their 
interest in securing Maxum’s coverage of Carman’s potential 
liability to the Kellys.  Indeed, “[i]n determining the alignment 
of the parties for jurisdictional purposes, . . . courts have a 
‘duty’ to ‘look beyond the pleadings and arrange the parties 
according to their sides in the dispute.’”  Dev. Fin. Corp. v. 
Alpha Hous. & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 
69 (1941)).  To do so, the court must identify the “principal 
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purpose of the suit” and look at “the facts as they existed at the 
time the action was commenced . . . to determine the position 
of the parties.”  Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal 
Co., 905 F.2d 42, 45-46 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Indianapolis, 
314 U.S. at 69). 
 
Having decided to abstain from entertaining the 
Declaratory Action, the District Court declined to consider 
Maxum’s argument.  Therefore, we will remand for the Court 
to decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the 




For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order and remand this action for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
